seminars, interview patients and staff, read up on their particular problem, and present a report to the other students in their year at the end. 'It's very labourintensive, you know', says the nice gynaecologist responsible for the group. 'Will you do a session with them on ethics? ' What are the ethical issues related to infertility? Fortunately I have been involved in the Institute of Medical Ethics (IME) study called Life before Birth: a Search for Consensus on Abortion and the Treatment of Infertility, just published. After the group and I introduce ourselves to one another, I get them to tell me what they have learned so far -some basic facts about the causes of infertility, the techniques available, counselling procedures, the chances of success. As this seems mostly to be about in vitro fertilisation (IVF), I decide to sketch in the background, the prehistory of the ethics of IVF: what Feversham thought about AID and AIH ('What's AIH? a student asks), back in 1960, how it never was officially organised, the questions about consequences for the couples, the children and society, the churches' misgivings about separating sex and procreation. Somewhere in all this I try to introduce ideas about rationality, personhood and the moral community. And so on to Warnock, surrogacy, embryo research.
Before this gets very far, the students are interrupting. Last year one of them was involved in a study related to the possibility of prenatal diagnosis of Huntington's chorea. This leads to a discussion of the ethics of positive and negative eugenics. How do we know what is best for individuals, for society? Maybe I get across a point about possible conflict between the doctor's concern for his particular patient (medical beneficence) and for society (justice). About half of the ninety-minute session turns out to be on abortion. The GP trainees -or those who are willing to declare themselves -seem as divided on the subject as the first-year students were, although even the firmest anti-abortionist admits being willing to prescribe the coil. I fly my own kite. Just because there is no point between fertilisation and birth (and maybe not those either) which logically marks a change in moral status, it doesn't follow that any relevant moral judgement is entirely relative, entirely personal. Exercising moral judgement means taking a variety of different kinds of moral argument into account, and while recognising their complexity, trying to be clear, comprehensive and consistent, albeit always fallible. If you prescribe the coil but pull out all the stops for the premature baby, at what point or stage does a second patient have a claim on the doctor? How much weight do you give to the stage of fetal development, the parents' attitudes, estimates of consequences and so forth? Might it not just be possible, over time, to agree on some more consistent public criteria than at present for making case by case decisions? It would be fairer to women seeking abortion, and might avoid some problems for doctors if such criteria were known. These suggestions have some, but not many takers. The trainees themselves reject the argument ofone that viability is what counts because until then the fetus is dependent on the mother: basically the same argument, they point out, would allow infanticide.
The rest of the session is about breaking confidentiality in the case of a potentially dangerous patient and about how to deal with an adult schizophrenic whose parents have rejected him. I suggest that the latter might be regarded differently if the schizophrenic were rejected by a wife. This provokes some discussion of how moral judgements are coloured by cultural assumptions. But mostly, they argue, frequently getting pretty quickly to the nub of the relevant moral argument and sometimes picking up on the philosophical arguments heard (or perhaps read) earlier. 
